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Cognitive Processes Involved in Solving
Information Systems ([S) Design Problems
By E. Sue Weber

Department of Management Information Systems
The University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona

ABSTRACT
The author characterizes systems analysis and design as a cognitive problem-solving process
and suggests that many implementations fail because Information Systems (IS) designers do
not adequately understand the cognitive processes involved. The author explores problem

understanding as well as the dynamic relationship between it and plan development and points
to areas in which research will not only increase the probability of successful IS implementations but will also contribute to the theoretical foundations of IS,

Human Information-Processing

Introduction
Systems analysis and design can be characterized as a

THE FRAMEWORK

ures of Information Systems (IS) projects, it seems fair
to say that IS designers do not appear to be particularly

Knowledge and its organization is vital to successful
problem solving in complex, realistic situations (Chase

problem-solving process. If we look at the history of failable problem solvers. We have an extensive literature
which details the failures of the past and attempts to identify problem areas where designers need to develop sen-

sitivity and expertise (Bostrom and Heinen, 1977); Ginz-

berg, 1981; Keen and Gerson, 1977). We have a nascent
literature which has begun to explore cognitive issues in
the design process (Boland, 1978; Malhotra, Thomas,

Carroll, and Miller, 1980). Here, the ways in which
knowledge affects the problem-solving performance of
software designers have been investigated (Bonar, Ehrlich, Soloway, and Rubin, 1981; Jeffries, Turner, Polson, and Atwood, 1980) as well as the relationship of the
problem-solving behavior of IS designers to successful

performance (Soloway, Ehrlich, Bonar, and Greenspan,
1982; Vitalari and Dickson, 1983).

and Simon, 1973; Chi, Glaser, and Rees, 1982; DiSessa,
1983; Larkin, 1983; McDermott and I.arkin, 1978;

Simon and Simon, 1978). As a result, it is important to

understand how individuals perceive, learn, store, and
retrieve information.

The human information-processing framework describes
mental events in terms of transformations of information
from input to output. Information in the form of some
physical energy is received by sensory receptors sensitive to that particular form of energy, transformed into
nerve impulses, and sent to a sensory register in the cen-

tral nervous system. In order to avoid information overload, most of these signals are blocked and are processed
no further. This filtering process is affected by the expe-

rience and prior knowledge of the individual and is,

This new line of inquiry is very promising. It is the thesis

therefore, highly personal. Only a small subset of the

of this paper that we will significantly improve our ability

original stimuli is kept for representation in short-term

to design successful IS when we better understand the
cognitive processes involved in solving design problems.
This understanding will contribute not only to improved
practice, but also to IS theory. In this respect, initial research results already appear to necessitate a restructuring of our models of the IS design process.

memory (STM) or active consciousness. Here the infor-

mation available to the individual is limited and must be
kept active or it will be lost. New information in STM can
be integrated with known information, recalled for this
purpose from long-term memory (LTM), andthen stored
in LTM as either declarative or procedural information.
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Images are analog knowledge representations. Research

Once information has been stored in LTM, it must be
retrieved to be used agaoin. In conscious response, information flows from LTM to STM and then to a response
generator which organizes the individual's responses and

suggests that people use mental imagery when tasks require spatial manipulation of information. There are
informal reports that people also use imagery in thinking

about abstract relationships. Designers are often said to

guides the effectors, those involved in design usually
being the hands, arms, and voice of the designer.

use mental imagery to solve problems. Reresentations

serve different functions in STM and LTM. In the
former, they are manipulated and transformed. In the lat-

KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION

ter, they are preserved. There is general agreement on

The knowledge we possess is thought to be of two types.

of manipulating information within the constraints of

whether it is used in LTM. It is, however, a compact way
active consciousness.

Declarative information is all the facts, generalizations,
theories, and personal memories that we have ever stored

One of the important points about this hypothetical con-

in LTM. Procedural knowledge is knowledge of how to
do something. procedural knowledge appears to be imdeclarative knowledge, on the other hand, appears to be

struct is that knowledge is represented in forms that
reduce the burden on STM. Propositional networks keep
related knowledge accessible. When we think about an

important in deciding what procedures to use in novel sit-

idea, related ideas come to mind. Production systems

portant in performing competently in familiar situations;

reduce the burden by letting control flow automatically
from one step in a sequence to another. Because of its
automaticity, the sequence of procedural operations
require little space in STM. It is thought that mental
imagery may require minimum space because of pre-pro-

uations. Both are important to solving design problems.

Research has shown that successful problem solvers possess a great deal of domain-specific information. They
often possess more declarative knowledge than unsuccessful solvers. More importantly, they appear to possess

cessing by the sensory receptors (Y.R. Wang, personal

more procedural information. The critical difference,
however, appears to derive from the organization oftheir
domain-specific knowledge (Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser,
1981; Chi, Glaser, and Rees, 1982; Gagne, 1985).

communication, August 1, 1985).

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
DECLARAT[VE AND PROCEDURAL
INFORMATION

In order to discuss differences between successful and
unsuccessful problem solvers, I shall briefly present
three forms of knowledge representation that fit with the

architectural constraints of the human information-

LTM can be thought of as a propositional network in

processing system. There are many views of how LTM

which procedural units are embedded close to related
propositions. This model of LTM reflects the close interaction between declarative and procedural information in
learning and in problem solving. Declarative information

is structured. I accept the view that all of an individual's
declarative knowledge is represented in a propositional
network. This network is a hypothetical construct; we do
not actually know how information is represented in a

interacts with procedures in everyday problem solving by

providing the data they need. It also appears to mediate

physiological sense. According to the construct, a basic
unit in the human information-processing system is the

the insight required for creative problem solving. In
acquiring a new procedure, learners often represent it to
themselves in declarative form until the steps become

proposition. It corresponds to an idea but is more abstract
than a sentence. We remember the gist of what was said

automatic (Anderson, 1982). Other learners have developed procedures for learning declarative information

rather than the exact wording. Propositional networks

are sets of interrelated propositions, all ideas ultimately
being associated with all other ideas. Propositions shar-

(Weinstein and Mayer, 1985).

ing ideas are more closely related than those that do not.

LEARNING DECLARATIVE
INFORMATION

Procedural knowledge is represented by productions or
condition-action rules. A rule's (f clause specifies the
conditions that must be present; its then clause specifies
the actions that occur when those conditions are met. Pro-

ductions are thought to be interrelated in sets called pro-

Learning encompasses four sub-processes: 1) selection,
2) construction, 3) integration, and 4) acquisition (Wein-

duction systems. The result of the application of one
production in the set provides the conditions needed for
another production in the system to apply. A sequence of

stein and Mayer, 1985). During selection, the learner
attends to environmental stimuli and transfers this information to STM. In construction, connections are built in

related actions takes place automatically.

STM between ideas contained in this information.
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tion of patterns being a necessary condition for the cor-

During integration, the learner actively searches for related prior knowledge in LTM and transfers it to STM;

rect application of rules. Learning action sequences is
usually slow and awkward. First, the learner represents
a series of actions in propositional form. Then a procedural representation of the action sequence develops with

in' addition, external connections are built between. incoming and prior information. In acquisition, the learner
actively transfers integrated information from active consciousness into LTM.

practice in trying to produce the action sequence. Com-

puter programming in an action sequence that is typically
Organizational strategies are important in selection and
construction. Organized incoming ideas activate related

learned in this way. Procedural knowledge is developed

propositions in LTM. Activiation spreads along the links

pertise in solving design problems takes.years of experience.

only through practice and feedback. Consequently, ex-

of the propositional network to related propositions. By
classifying an encounter with an unhappy user as an instance ofuser resistance to change, a designer would trigger facts related to resistance and change already orga-

Problem Solving

nized and stored in LTM. Organization enhances the

memorability of information a great deal. It may keep the
A DEFINITION

spread of activation of the propositional network to the

relevant area of LTM; and it may provide pointers in

There are many definitions of problem solving. I use a
general definition which equates normal directed thinking and problem solving. In this view, problem solving

STM to the relevant areas of LTM. Although retrieval

from memory is not perfect, it occurs systematically and
reflects the organization in memory of the individual's
knowledge (Greene, 1973). There is growing evidence
from a number of studies that successful and unsuccessful
problem solvers differ primarily in the quality of the

involves the active manipulation of perceived, learned,

and retrieved informaion. It can be conceived of as a
search of a problem space.

organization of their domain-specific knowledge (Chi,

Glaser, and Rees, 1982).

SUCCESSFUL PROBLEM SOLVING
During integration, these new propositions and related
prior information may stimulate the generation of other
new propositions. All the new propostions, whether perceived in the environment or elaborated by the learner,
are stored close to the prior knowledge activated during
learning. The resulting elaborations provide alternate
pathways for retrieval so that if one pathway is blocked,

Many (Jeffries, Poison, Razan, and Atwood, 1977; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, and Simon, 1980; Simon and
Simon, 1978) have explored the differences in knowl-

edge between those who solve problems skillfully and
often correctly and have found differences ih their search

strategies-processes used to select the operators to apply

another can be used. These alternative routes may be one
reason why designers have found problem solving by
analogy so effective and efficient.

to a problem. Others (Chase and Simon, 1973; DeGroot,
1966) have found that successful and unsuccessful prob-

LEARNING PROCEDURAL
INFORMATION

problems, much of the search occurs in LTM. Memory
functions as a second environment, parallel to the sensorial environment, through which the problem solver

An important difference between successful and unsucmore domain-specific procedural knowledge. There are
two principal types of procedural knowledge: patternrecognition and action-sequence procedures. Patternrecognition procedures are essential to the ability to rec-

directs the search. In any particular problem-solving
episode, much of the search is guided by the content and
organization of the information acquired by the individual to that point. Problem solvers use task-specific strategies to the extent that they have been able to ascertain
the underlying structure of the task. Otherwise, they use

ognize and classify patterns of stiumli. Many patterns are

general search strategies.

tem solvers search in similar ways but that successful
problem solvers are able to represent problems in ways
that make search easier. In solving complex dewsign

cessful problem solvers is that the former have much

learned through generalization and discrimination. In
Problem difficulty is a function o f the amount of structure
of the problem, the power of the chosen solution methods, and the knowledge available to the solver for con-

generalizing, we respond in a similar way to stimuli that
differ. Discrimination, on the other hand, restricts the
range of situations to which a procedure applies and is

stimulated when a known procedure does not work
(Gagne, 1985).

straining the problem space. Unfortunately, the IS
designer must solve problems where the goal state is
poorly defined, the operators are not given, and the probtem space is enormous. In addition, the IS knowledge
base is incomplete and solution methods are weak (Vital-

Action-sequence procedures are sequences of actions
coupled with pattern-recognition procedures, recogni-
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ari, 1981). With research into the knowledge required for
successful IS design, we would eventually be able to enhance the problem-solving skills of IS designers through
the development of knowledge-based design tools.

PROBLEM UNDERSTANDING
While we have not agreed on the best methods for solving
IS design problems (Zave, 1984), we do agree that we
must begin by understanding them (Boehm, 1981; DeMarco, 1982; Ginzberg, 1981; Keen, 1981; Weber,

at providing designers with declarative knowledge and
pattern-recognition procedures that we hope will contribute to the efficient management of the designer's mental
resources and, as a result, contribute to the successful

management of the project. Keen and Gerson (1977) and
Markus (1983), for example, have helped build a rich
body of patterns to aid in the interpretation of political
events which often occur during IS implementation.
Much of designers' practical experience results in the
development of action-sequence procedures which are
linked with pattern-recognition procedures.

Not only do the patterns triggered by environmental features tell us what to see and where to see it; they also
direct retrieval from memory. We actively seek information relevant to the current situation not only from the
problem situation but also from our memories. Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) suggest that the process of remembering is similar to that of perceiving. In remembering, however, memory is the data source rather than

1984). Yet, when we agree that problem understanding

is an essential first step, our consensus is somewhat
meaningless. We speak of problem understanding,
implying that there is a single global problem that must

be understood before it can be solved. This is not true.
There is a myriad of problems and attendant subproblems
that must be addressed in designing a system. We speak

of understanding, but we have not defined what we mean
when we say that an individual understands a design
problem. Nor have we explored empirically the dynamic

sensory experience. In this connection, it is important to
realize that the memories on which this process is based
are not fragments of the original sensory input, but are

relationship between problem understanding and solution.

instead fragmentary representations of our initial interpretation of that input.

PROBLEM REPRESENTATION

A designer may have successfully managed a project
fraught with political issues in the past. When environ-

We can, in fact, be said to understand a problem when
we are able to construct an internal representation in

mental clues trigger the retrieval of a problem pattern,

what will be recalled will be those features of the original

memory of the problem space and a set of operators for

problem that are consistent with the pattern. What we

moving from one state to another in that space (Simon,
1981). Therefore, the first step in solving a design problem is to represent the problem. Problem representation

think we see is thus based upon comparison with complex

can be a very difficult task requiring a great deal of experience or expertise. Yet, because it determines which
be solved at all (Chase and Simon, 1973; DeGroot,
1966). Larkin (1983) argued that in scientific problem

care in data analysis and in hypothesis seeking to counterbalance the effects of the perceptual filter. Designers
contribute from their own experience, either by addition
or by subtraction, to their perception of the phenomenon
before them. As a result, they need rich, wide experience
as well as the capacity for flexibility in thought (Archer,

solving an important part of expertise is the ability to rep-

1964).

collections of previous experiences and expectations. We
cannot, as designers, believe our own eyes and must take

knowledge will be activated, it effects the ease with

which a problem can be solved and even whether it can

resent the problem and, in so doing, udnerstand it. She
found that successful solvers usually construct a sophisti-

cated problem representation while unsuccessful solvers

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

use primitive representations. Since a problem representation is constructed on the basis of the solver's domainrelated klnowledge and its organization, the relationship

McDermott and Larkin (1978) have developed a. multi-

between expertise and success is not surprising.

They speculate that a solver's first step is merely to trans-

stage model of the process of problem representation.
latethe problem as originally presented into a form which
clearly describes the situation specified in the problem.
A second stage involves the drawing of a sketch or diagram of the situation to represent the literal objects in the
problem and their relationships. The third stage is a qualitative analysis of the problem. Qualitative analysis,
which novices appear to skip (Chi, Feitovich, and
Glaser, 1981; Larkin, 1980), is the process by which ex-

PATTERN RECOGNITION
Designers learn problem patterns through experience.

With time these patterns become more and more refined.
Gradually they are also linked to action-sequence procedures. To understand a new problem situation, an experi-

perts are thought to construct a rich and rather abstract

enced designer scans the environment for familiar patterns (Vitalari, 1981). Much of our IS literature is aimed

internal representation in which objects and relations are
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DECOMPOSITION

linked to solution procedures. It exploits fully the problem solver's specialized knowledge of the relevant domain to generate a theoretical problem description. In
physics problem solving there is also a fourth stage in
which equations are generated (McDermott and Larkin,
1978).

IS designers are expected to handle ill-structured problems as a matter of course. Polya (1957) has recommended that a solver in such a situation first attempt to
understand the problem. The problem as a whole should

be made so clear and should be so well impressed upon
Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1981) have developed a
model in which there is more interacting among the
stages than was proposed by McDermott and Larkin
(1978). They hypothesize that experts, as opposed to

the solver's mind that the solver can attend to component

novices, do not construct a literal problem description as

which are apt to contribute to problem resolution. One of
the ways in which expert software designers differ from

details with no fear of forgetting it. A grasp of the entire

problem helps drive the process of decomposition; it also
helps the solver simplify and concentrate on those details

their first step. They believe that for experts, qualitative

novices is in their ability to deal with details at many

analysis occurs immediately, even if briefly, and that it
reoccurs often during the process. For the expert, solving

levels of decomposition and yet never lose track of their

ultimate goal (Jeffries, Turner, Poison, and Atwood,
1980).

a problem seems to begin with a provisional identification of the problem type after a gross preliminary analysis

in which problem features are matched with known patterns. The knoowledge useful for the problem is indexed

knowledge bases of experts are organized in ways that

According to Polya, whose recommendations derived
from years of experience in solving complex problems,
the next step is to break the problem down into its components. A single design problem is a complex of hundreds of subproblems, each of which can be resolved so
as to produce a cluster of acceptable solutions. Jeffries,
Turner, Poison and Atwood (1980) found that when
expert designers perceive a particular problem to be com-

are well suited to the demands of domain-specific prob-

plex, they decompose it into a group of more manageable

lems. Their hierarchical organization helps manage the
constraints of STM by allowing experts to keep all appro-

problems have known solutions. The process of decom-

when a given problem is categorized as a specific type.

Once a potential category is activated, declarative and
procedural data for solving the problem are available
within seconds. One becomes an expert in a field by acquiring and organizing the declarative and procedural
knowledge necessary for success in that domain. The

subproblems, eventually reaching a point where all sub-

priate hypotheses about the nature ofthe problem in mind
while considering additional data. Experts become able
not only to recognize situations and to provide informa-

posing complex problems into manageable units seems to

tion about them but also to use powerful skills to deal with

novice designers (Archer, 1963-1; Jeffries, Turner, Polson and Atwood, 1980).

be central to the task of design in any field and mastery
of decomposition appears to distinguish expert from

problem situations as they arise (Simon, 1981). Conse-

quently, solving a problem becomes a matter of categorizing the problem into one or more problem types and

The difficult task is to reconcile the solutions of the subproblems with one another. When the optimum solution

using the available knowledge.

of one subproblem entails the acceptance of a poor
solution for another, the designer must rank order the

Information Systems Design

complex of solutions. Eventually subproblems and their
solutions must be coordinated and linked together in a coherent design which must then be implemented (Archer,
1963-1). Malhotra, Thomas, Carroll, and Miller (1980)
found that generation of design solutions seems to consist

DESIGN KNOWLEDGE

Jeffries, Turner, Poison, and Atwood (1980) found that
experienced designers acquire a gret deal of well-organized abstract knowledge about design and design processes. They found it guides the generation and evaluation of design alternatives, prescribes functions that
design components must satisfy, and helps determine

of attempting to find design elements to meet functional

requirements and then tying them together into a coherent
design.

what design components must satisfy, and helps determine what design elements to consider next. In contrast

PROBLEM SOLVING BY ANALOGY

to novices, experienced designers generate and evaluate

The second task that Polya (1957) set the problem solver

more alternatives, are more methodical in their expansion of design components, and consider more of the
important functions that need to be accomplished.

was that of breaking the problem down into its components. When the principal parts were distinctly ar-

ranged and clearly conceived and when one's memory
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seem responsive, the solver's first question was to be:
"Have I seen this problem before?" IS designers do
seem to ask this question first (Jeffries, Turner, Polson,

and Atwood, 1980; Malhotra, Thomas, Carroll, and Miller, 1980). It is an extremely efficient way to solve problems and it enormously reduces the amount of problem

solving effort.

Designers often use mental imagery in developing solutions, the analog representations being manipulated for
that purpose in STM. Sketches, diagrams, and drawings
are ways of generating external representations that relate a problem directly to an individual's knowledge of
the world. They help reveal inconsistencies in this infor-

mation and also serve as a set of external memory struc-

tures.
Problem solving by analogy is a clear case of routine,
rather than creative, problem solving. When a problem
representation generated for a given subproblem is recognized as being analogous to an already familiar algorithm, that algorithm is evaluated for applicability in the
current situation. If it is found to be appropriate, it is debugged and incorporated into the developing solution.
Turner (1983) believes that designers first try to solve IS

design problems by using this strategy and that they abandon it and attempt to restructure the problemonly asa last
resort. Problem solving by analogy is an extremely efficient way to solve problems and it enormously reduces
the amount of problem-solving effort. But it has its dangers. If we habitually solve a given type of problem in
one way, the solution used becomes automatic. Once it
is automatic, learning alternative solutions is difficult because the conditions that trigger those alternatives never
enter STM. When this question does not elicit a ready
response, the problem solver should try to see the problem in a different way by looking for traces of other patterns among the stimuli in the environment. By varying
the surface features of the problem a new pattern may
emerge that will trigger an appropriate problem category.

SEEING THE LIGHT
Sometimes the problem can be solved only by a creative

restructuring of the individual's problem representation.

Trying to fit problem elements together in a new way is

extremely difficult. Insight, seeing connections between
seemingly different areas, appears to be mediated by
declarative knowledge and is often triggered by a clue
that the solver often never consciously notices.

Checklists of factors that designers have found by experience to be relevant to particular types of problems are

effective clues (Archer, 1963-2; Malhotra, Thomas,
Carroll, and Miller, 1980). There are, of course, times

when an designer does not possess relevant declarative
knowledge and providing direction does not trigger recognition of appropriate information. In these situations

designers with different areas of expertise can profitably

work together. Brainstorming represents a technique for

extracting in as short a time as possible a great deal of the
declarative and procedural knowledge embodied in the

collective experience of such groups.

A preference for this analogical process may be related
not only to its efficiency and its capacity for conserving
the designer's mental resources, but also to the way in
which many designers have learned their craft. A great
many experienced designers have had little formal training. When one learns on the job in a bottom-up, datadriven fashion, one learns techniques first. Concepts are
slower to develop. When techniques or algorithms work,
we tend to fix them in our memory. Because it can stifle

ANALYSIS VERSUS SYNTHESIS
We usually speak and write of analysis and design as if
they were two separate processes widely separated in
time and function. Our models of the IS design process
certainly reflect a prevalent understanding that these are

distinct processes. Studies of problem solving in complex, real-world situations, however, have shown that

creativity, problem solving by analogy needs to be used

they are but two facets of the same process and that, for
experts, they occur within seconds of one another. When
a problem is understood, that is, when a problem is cate-

with care. Designers need to realize that the routine application of past habits can inhibit creative problem solving in situations that demand novel solutions.

gorized as a particular type on the basis of the knowledge
available to the solver, a solution model is instantaneously available. If this is true, and it appears to be, then
analysis and design must be seen as one inextricably
linked process rather than a set of divergent and con-

THE ROLE OF SKETCHES

vergent processes.

When a solver is not able to retrieve an algorithm for
solving the problem from memory, one must be con-

structed on the basis of the information stored in memory. To help them, problem solvers sometimes use what
Greeno (1973) called imaginal processes to represent the

Conclusion

important relationships in a problem. A key element in
the design process is the creation of a model of a finished

Information System analysis and design can be character-

work in advance of its embodiment (Archer, 1963-1).

ized as a problem-solving process. To solve a problem,

310

-

Archer, L.B. "Systematic Method for Designers: Part 4,

one must understand the problem, devise and implement
a plan, and finally evaluate and monitor the solution.

Examining the Evidence", Design, Volume 179,

Un'derstanding means solution, but it requires knowledge. The understanding of IS design problems requires
a great deal of information that is well organized and well

1963, pp. 68-72.
Archer, L.B. "Systematic Method for Designers: Part 5,
the Creative Leap", Design, Volume 181,1964, pp.

50-52.
Boehm, B. W. Software Engineering Economics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981,
Boland, R.J. "The Process and Product of System Design", Management Science, Volume 24, 1978, pp.

suited to design tasks. Qualitative as well as quantitative

differences between expert and novice designers derive
primarily from differences in their knowledge bases, In
the light of the extensive research in other areas as well

of those few studies in IS, it is clear that many of the failures that IS designers have experienced have derived
from problems in the development and management of

887-898.

Bonar, J., Ehrlich, K., Soloway, E., and Rubin, E.
"Collecting and Analyzing On-line Protocols from
Novice Programmers",
Behavior Research

their knowledge bases.

There are a great many problems that researchers in IS

Methods and Instrumentation,Volume 14,1981, pp.

would like to solve, problems to which many people have
devoted a great deal of time and effort. Because of the

Bostrom, R.P., and Heinen, J.S. "MIS Problems and

203-209.

background laid by researchers in many disciplines, we

Failures: A Socio-technical Perspective: Part I, The
Causes", MIS Quarterly, Volume 1,1977, pp.
17-32.

can begin to explore these problems with a more realistic
view of what it means to solve problems, It means that

we have to be clear about what we do know. We must re-

Chase, W.G., and Simon, H.A. "Perception in Chess"

structure our models of the design process to reflect reality more closely. In order to find a problem, solvers must
have a model of the process; yet our basic model of sys-

Cognitive Psychology, Volume 4, 1973, pp. 55-81.
Chi, M.T.H., Feltovich, P.J., and Glaser, R. "Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems by
Experts and Novices", Cognitive Science, Volume
5, 1981, pp. 121-152.
Chi, M.T.H., Glaser, R., and Rees, E. "Expertise in

tems design process would seem to be flawed. At the very
least, this would reduce the gap perceived by many suc-

cessful and experienced designers between practice and
theory (Archer, 1963-1, 1963-2, 1964; Turner, 1983).

Problem Solving", In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence

It would improve our teaching; our students would be
better prepared for the reality of systems analysis and

(Vol. 1, pp. 7-75). Hillsdale, NJ: Ertbaum, 1982.
DeGroot, A.D. "Perception and Memory Versus

design. More importantly such restructuring would help
clarify our thinking and point to promising lines of funda-

Thought: Some Old Ideas and Recent Findings",In

mental research.

B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.), Problem-solving: Research,
Method, and Theory. New York: Wiley, 1966.

DeMarco, T. Controlling Software Products: Manage-

We need to discover what the experts in our field know,
We need to learn more about the declarative and proce-

ment, Measurement, and Estimation. New York:
Yourdon Press, 1982.
DiSessa, A. "Phenomenology and the Evolution of Intui-

dural knowledge important for successful IS design. A
better understanding of the design process could lead to

tion", In D. Gentner and A.L. Stevens (Eds.), Men-

the development of knowledge-based design tools. A
clearer understanding of problem solving could lead to
the development of basic tools that could facilitate creative problem solving whenever such creative thinking
was called for by either our students, our clients, or our-

tal Models (pp. 15-34). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum,
1983.
Gagne, E.D. The Cognitive Psychology of School Learning. Boston: Little, Brown: 1985.
Ginzberg, M.J. (1981). "Early Diagnosis of MIS Imple-

selves. Simon wrote that the proper study of mankind is

mentation Failure: Promising Results and Unans-

the study of design, our common core of knowledge
(Simon, 1981). Exploring the cognitive processes involved in solving IS design problems holds great promise
for the future of our field and will extend to discoveries

wered Questions", Management Science, Volume
27, pp. 459-478.
Greeno, J.G. "The Structure of Memory and the Process
of Solving Problems", In R.L. Solso (Ed.),
Contemporary Issues in Cognitive Psychology: The

that we cannot now imagine.
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